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VOTES AT WORK IN BRITAIN: SHAREHOLDER MONOPOLISATION AND THE ‘SINGLE 
CHANNEL’ 
Ewan McGaughey*  
 
Abstract 
Why do shareholders monopolise voting rights in UK companies, and are trade unions the only way to get 
meaningful workplace representation? In 1967 a Labour Party policy document first coined the phrase that a 
‘single channel’ for representation should ‘in the normal’ case mean trade unions. Since then, it has been said 
the labour movement embraced an ‘adversarial’ rather than a ‘constitutional’ conception of  corporations, 
neglecting legal rights to worker voice in enterprise governance. This article shows that matters were not so 
simple. It explains the substantial history of  legal rights to vote in British workplaces, and competition from 
the rival constitutional conception: employee share schemes. The UK has the oldest corporations – namely 
universities – which have consistently embedded worker participation rights in law. Britain has among the 
world’s most sophisticated ‘second channel’ participation rights in pension board governance. Developing 
with collective bargaining, it had the world’s first private corporations with legal participation rights. Although 
major plans in the 1920s for codetermination in rail and coal fell through, it maintained a ‘third channel’ of  
worker representatives on boards during the 20th century in numerous sectors, including ports, gas, post, steel, 
and buses. At different points every major political party had general proposals for votes at work. The 
narrative of  the ‘single channel’ of  workplace representation, and an ‘adversarial’ conception of  the company 
contains some truth, but there has never been one size of  regulation for all forms of  enterprise.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The ‘single channel’ is a familiar narrative in UK labour law. It says that next to collective 
bargaining ‘there were no significant competing functions’ of  worker representation.1 A 
‘second’ channel of  work councils, and a ‘third’ channel of  votes for boards of  directors 
did not exist because there were ‘deep-rooted adversarial conceptions’ in collective 
bargaining, which idealised an ‘adversarial rather than a constitutional’ conception of  
company law.2 This narrative had divided politicians and unions, because some said trade 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Private Law, King’s College, London and Research Associate, Centre for Business Research, University of  
Cambridge. My thanks to David Kershaw, Marc Moore, Paul Davies, Hugh Collins, Nicola Countouris, Janet 
Williamson and Mark Freedland for previous discussions or comments, and my especial thanks for comments from 
three anonymous referees. Please email ewan.mcgaughey@kcl.ac.uk for discussion. 
1 PL Davies and C Kilpatrick, ‘UK Worker Representation after Single Channel’ (2004) 33 ILJ 121, which argues the 
UK passed the opportunity to make a ‘vibrant, harmonious and effective system of  worker representation’ because it 
was wedded to a single channel, even if  it was clear that elected but non-union representation was better than none.   
2 B Clift, A Gamble and M Harris, ‘The Labour Party and the Company’ in JE Parkinson, A Gamble and G Kelly, The  
2 
unions should remain the ‘single channel’, for boards of  public bodies,3 on boards of  large 
companies,4 or in other work councils.5 Today it is clear, binding rights to vote on specific 
issues and consultative work councils are spreading, and general proposals for worker votes 
for company boards have re-entered mainstream debate.6 But also, the view that Britain has 
always had an ‘adversarial’ and ‘single channel’ system is not so simple.7  
 This article uncovers the remarkable history of  votes at work in Britain. It poses 
two main questions. First, were British labour relations ever as simple as a ‘single channel’ 
narrative would suggest? This phrase was originally used in a 1967 Labour Party policy 
document to endorse integrating voice through trade unions with representation in public 
corporations.8 Afterwards, it became an object of  concern.9 Ironically, most of  the very 
people writing about the ‘single channel’ got votes in the corporations they worked for, 
namely at universities.10 The UK probably had the world’s first systems of  votes at work in 
public and private corporations,11 and through the 20th century workers voted for boards in 
ports, gas companies, the post, steel, and buses. It has an advanced system of  ‘second 
channel’ participation in occupational pensions.12 At various times, every major political 
party proposed worker votes in corporate governance.13 While a sizeable literature discusses 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Political Economy of  the Company (Hart 2000) ch 3, 53-54 and 68. 
3 Labour Party, National Executive Committee, Industrial Democracy (1967) 10-11, but note that the concept of  a ‘single 
channel’ here referred to combining union and board representation rather than adding to it. Unlike later usage, this 
early document saw consultation alongside unions as a potentially costly and disorganised ‘two-channel approach’.  
4 Alan Bullock, Report of  the committee of  inquiry on industrial democracy (1977) Cmnd 6706.  
5 See Commission v UK (1994) C-382/92, [48]-[51] and PL Davies, ‘A Challenge to Single Channel?’ (1994) 23 ILJ 272, 
284, suggesting the Whitley Reports of  1917 established the single channel principle by rejecting consultation rights 
without unions, though as part 2(1) shows there were many exceptions.  
6 e.g. J Pickard, ‘Theresa May vows corporate crackdown on ‘privileged few’’ (10 July 2016) Financial Times.  
7 The view of  Davies (1994) 23 ILJ 272, 277, that the single channel was a ‘largely unchallenged principle’ is obviously 
nuanced. As we know, the point of  a ‘principle’ is that it admits exceptions.  
8 National Executive Committee, Industrial Democracy (Labour Party 1967) 10-11, ‘in the normal case the workers’ 
representatives in the plant would be trade unionists.... what is now defined as bargaining and what is now defined as 
consultation would in future be dealt with in a single channel... The existence of  two channels of  communication and 
discussion between management and workers gives rise to a number of  persistent problems, many of  which remain 
even with goodwill on both sides.’ It goes on to list problems of  coordination, training and unsupported 
representatives being weaker against management.  
9 e.g. P Davies, ‘Bullock Report and Employee Participation in Corporate Planning in the U.K.’ (1978) 3(1) Journal of  
Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 245, 253.   
10 e.g. Oxford University Act 1854 ss 16 and 21, Cambridge University Act 1856 ss 5-51, Memorandum and Articles of  
Association of  the London School of  Economics and Political Science, art 10.5, Statutes of  the University of  Warwick, Charter 
and Statutes, Second Schedule 1, para 12, etc.  
11 Port of  London Act 1908 s 1(7), preceding the German Aufsichtsratsgesetz 1922, or in the US, in Massachusetts, An 
Act to enable manufacturing corporations to provide for the representation of  their employees on the board of  
directors (3 April 1919) Chap. 0070.  
12 Pensions Act 2004 ss 241-243, following Roy Goode, Pension Law Reform (1993) Cm 2342, para 4.5.19, ‘however 
scrupulous the employer may be, there is no substitute for the discipline of  another voice in the decision-making 
process, who can ensure that the employer-appointed trustees do not allow themselves, consciously or unconsciously, 
to be unduly influenced by the wishes and concerns of  the employer.’ 
13 To give just three examples, a Conservative government introduced the South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896. The 
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votes in worker co-operatives14 (either in trusts, or partnerships), this article focuses on 
lesser known legal development in votes at work in corporations, both public and private.  
 Second, is the lack of  votes at work ‘best understood as reflecting deep-rooted 
adversarial conceptions of  the company within the Labour movement’? Clift, Gamble and 
Harris have forcefully argued this adversarialism linked with a ‘weakness of  constitutional 
thinking’ about company law.15 But if  that were true, the deeper-rooted question was, what 
did adversarialism really mean and why was it there? A powerful, less discussed, 
constitutional conception did exist. But it challenged the idea of  votes at work without 
capital: investment of  property was needed for votes in companies, and workers only had an 
employment contract. Rooted in 19th century visions of  politics, investors of  labour had 
contractual wage claims and no more. If  people wanted votes at work, they could buy 
shares and, it was said, government might promote employee share schemes. Trade unions 
became averse to share schemes because without money, workers could not buy votes. And 
without votes at work, workers could get little money. This was a vicious circle of  logic, a 
catch-22. It pushed unions to stick with collective bargaining, and it pushed the idea of  
votes at work into an unhappy partnership with public ownership, where there would be no 
shareholders. But now, it appears this formalist thinking has changed. 
 Because 72 per cent of  employees are not covered by collective agreement,16 most 
people today no longer see the ‘single channel’: their voice at work is muted. However, as 
the map below shows, general codetermination laws have now spread to a majority of  EU 
countries,17 as well as Norway. Consistent with historical practice in the UK and Europe,18 
the labour movement has pressed for votes at work through collective agreements, and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Liberal Party had an official codetermination policy with The Report of  the Industrial Partnership Committee: Partners at 
Work (1968), and the Labour Party commissioned the Report of  the committee of  inquiry on industrial democracy (1977) 
Cmnd 6706. Details of  all are discussed below. 
14 e.g. R Owen, The crisis: and national co-operative trades’ union gazette (11 January 1834) vol III, no 20. See generally R 
Miliband, ‘The Politics of  Robert Owen’ (1954) 15(4) Journal of  the History of  Ideas 233. Owen believed in ‘mutual 
confidence and kindness’ between employee and employe. Even as the first trade union confederation leader he was 
sceptical of  ‘petty proceedings about strikes for wages’. 
15 Clift, Gamble and Harris (2000) ch 3, 81. 
16 See DBIS, Trade Union Membership 2014: Statistical Bulletin (June 2015) 34, Table 1.1. 
17 In private companies, 15 out of  28 EU member states have codetermination laws. Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the UK had no general law. Greece, Malta, Spain, Portugal and Ireland had it in the 
public sector. France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovakia and Croatia had under one third in private companies 
(sometimes voluntary) depending on size. Germany has sub-parity codetermination on supervisory boards. Austria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, and Slovenia fix one third of  boards (some supervisory, some unitary). Sweden, 
Poland, Bulgaria and Finland have codetermination of  around a third of  board members (depending again on size).  
18 On pension codetermination in the UK, see E McGaughey, Participation in Corporate Governance (2014) ch 6(1)(b) and 
see E McGaughey, ‘The Codetermination Bargains: The History of  German Corporate and Labour Law’ (2017) 23(1) 
Columbia Journal of  European Law 135. 
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sought to codify those practices in law. There are many models, including a minimum 
percentage of  votes in company general meetings with shareholders,19 and a minimum of  
directors on boards. This will be seen as necessary because collective bargaining and 
nationalisation, by itself, has been vulnerable to short-term political change. Worldwide, the 
labour movement is no longer just seeking temporary bargains, but board seats.20 They seek 
to socialise, not just ownership today, but the votes in the economy on a lasting basis. 
History shows there is no one-size-fits-all theory of  enterprise, but there are minimum 
standards, and the right to vote at work is becoming an essential part of  a modern 
economic constitution.  
 
                                                          
19 For earlier examples, see South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896 and the Liberal Party, The Report of  the Industrial Partnership 
Committee: Partners at Work (1968) discussed below. See now KD Ewing, et al, A Manifesto for Labour Law: towards a 
comprehensive revision of  workers’ rights (Institute of  Employment Rights, 2016) 23, 3.22. 
20 To give just two very small examples, see Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, ‘Viva DGB, viva Solidarity’ (2009) Ausgabe 10/2009 
reporting Sharan Burrow, head of  the International Trade Union Confederation saying ‘she hoped to see more 
exporting of  codetermination from Germany’. On developments regarding work councils, and legal options, see B 
Sachs, ‘Can a Members-Only Union Validate a Works Council?’ (11 July 2014) onlabor.org. 
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2. VOTES AT WORK IN BRITAIN 
The principle of  votes at work existed long before most people could vote for Parliament. 
One of  the earliest examples emerged in 1850, shortly after the turmoil of  the 1848 
revolutions unfolded across the European continent.21 With widespread dissatisfaction in 
universities, the government launched enquiries into their governance. The Oxford 
University Commission of  1852, hardly a radical body, was determined to reverse 
‘successive interventions by which the government of  the University was reduced to a 
narrow oligarchy.’22 Although its statutes were in some disarray, the Commission 
characterised the university as one which ‘appears to have been at the first an association of  
teachers united only by mutual interest’.23 On the Report’s recommendations, the Oxford 
University Act 1854 sections 16 and 21 set out the composition and a new right of  election 
of  ‘fellow’ employees to the Hebdomadal Council. Similarly, the Cambridge University Act 
1856 sections 5 and 12 soon required ‘electors’ to have votes for ‘graces’ (plebiscites 
binding management) and in electing the University Council.24 Often forgotten, these 
practices spread to most universities and further education institutions throughout the UK 
today.25 Of  course, 19th century universities were hardly ‘workplace democracies’, because 
non-academic, or less senior staff, might not be enfranchised. Nevertheless, a right to vote 
came from work.  
 In those earlier times, the contrast to the vast majority of  UK workplaces was stark. 
Trade unions had only just been legalised, and strikes were still wrongs, as courts asserted 
their jurisdiction ‘to protect property’.26 The Second Reform Act 1867 had only just 
reformed the proprietary system of  voting for Parliament. Men had votes if  they owned a 
home in a borough worth £10 per annum in rental value, or £12 per annum in counties.27 
In this way, possession of  property was deemed essential for participation in public life. 
                                                          
21 On one of  the implications of  those, see E McGaughey, ‘The codetermination bargains: the history of  German 
corporate and labour law’ (2017) 23(1) Columbia Journal of  European Law 135.  
22 Oxford University Commission, Report of  Her Majesty’s Commissioners appointed to inquire into State, Discipline, Studies and 
Revenues of  University and Colleges of  Oxford (1852) 8. See also P Searby, A History of  the University of  Cambridge: Volume 
III, 1750-1870 (CUP 1997) 518-23 and 530-533, on the parallel report aiming to end the ‘contradictory elements of  
democracy, anarchy, and oligarchic centralism’. 
23 Oxford University Commission (1852) 7.   
24 Oxford University Act 1854 ss 16 and 21 and Cambridge University Act 1856 ss 5-51.  
25 e.g. Education Reform Act 1988 ss 124A, 125 and Sch 7A, para 3 and see an example in the Memorandum and Articles 
of  Association of  the London School of  Economics and Political Science, art 10.5.  
26 eg Springhead Spinning Co v Riley (1868) LR 5 Eq 551, held that an injunction could be granted against a strike because, 
per Mallins VC, 558, ‘The jurisdiction of  this Court is to protect property’. 
27 Representation of  the People Act 1867 ss 4-6. The Great Reform Act 1832 (2&3 Will IV, c 45) had started the 
process by standardising voting rules across the country and eliminating the boroughs rules which were too small. 
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The Companies Act 1862 was drafted so that any person could become a member and 
have votes without buying shares, and the model constitution of  a company known as 
‘Table A’ could be altered to allocate voting rights in any way.28 But the company laws’ 
authors scathed the ‘grinding tyranny’ of  trade unions,29 and courts saw votes as a ‘right of  
property’.30 The dominant presupposition was that workers who only had their labour gave 
nothing of  adequate value for votes: in politics and the economy.  
 A more progressive view was that, in the words of  the political economist John 
Stuart Mill, everything should be done to promote the ‘Partnership principle’.31 Mill 
believed hierarchical employment could be replaced by associations of  labour and 
capitalists, and then worker cooperatives.32 But this ‘partnership’, in Mill’s eyes, involved the 
death of  one of  the partners: Mill thought it would be the ‘true euthanasia of  trade 
unions’.33 Apparently unions would be unnecessary if  workers had direct votes. As an 
example, Mill lauded the Yorkshire colliery of  Henry Briggs, Son and Co, which in 1865, 
converted into a limited company, and allowed workers to buy one third of  shares. 
Employees also received a bonus if  company profits exceeded 10 per cent of  capital. 
Briggs believed strikes and lockouts, which ‘respectable workmen and kind-hearted 
employers must alike deplore, will be rendered impossible for the future.’34 But Briggs 
found that not enough people took ‘the great and unprecedented opportunity offered’. In 
1869, the miners were given the right to elect a director, but in 1875 management sought a 
wage reduction. Strikes broke out, and the representation plan was dropped.35  
 Similarly the South Metropolitan Gas Company informally introduced a profit-
sharing and share distribution scheme in 1889. It sought a no-strike clause, but this failed 
                                                          
28 See the Companies Act 1862, Table A, art 44, referring to ‘Every member shall have one vote for every share up to 
ten...’ The previous Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, Table B, art 38, said explicitly the ‘shareholder shall have one 
vote for every share’... See now CA 2006 s 113(3) requiring a statement of  shares held by a member, but not requiring 
a member to hold shares.  
29 Robert Lowe MP, Third Reading of  Second Reform Bill, Hansard HC Debs (15 July 1867) col 1546, ‘the elite of  the 
working classes you are so fond of, are members of  trades unions... founded on principles of  the most grinding 
tyranny not so much against masters as against each other.... it was only necessary that you should give them the 
franchise, to make those trades unions the most dangerous political agencies that could be conceived’. J Micklethwait 
and M Wooldridge, The Company (2003) ch 3, call Lowe ‘the father of  modern company law’.   
30 e.g. Pender v Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70, per Lord Jessel MR, ‘you shall record my vote, as that is a right of  property 
belonging to my interest in this company...’  
31 JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (Longmans 1848) Book V, ch IX, §5.  
32 Mill (1848) Book IV, ch 7, §4, ‘the relation of  masters and work-people will be gradually superseded by partnership, in 
one of  two forms: in some cases, association of  the labourers with the capitalist; in others, and perhaps finally in all, 
association of  labourers among themselves.’ 
33 JS Mill, Thornton on Labour and Its Claims (June 1869) Fortnightly Review, Part II 
34 HC Briggs, ‘To the workmen employed at the Whitwood and Methley Junction Collieries’ (1865) LSE Selected 
Pamphlets, 1-2.  
35 DF Schloss, Methods of  Industrial Remuneration (3rd edn Williams and Norgate 1898) 282. 
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against the enormous London Dock Strike of  1889. Partly in an attempt to reconcile the 
workforce, partly out of  philanthropic support, and partly to undermine the union,36 the 
chairman Sir George Livesey procured the South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896.37 If  together 
employees reached a threshold of  ordinary shares, they were collectively guaranteed some 
board seats.38 It was a little more preferential than ordinary shareholdings, but it retained 
the message that money was needed.39 
 These theories and experiments were all based on the view that, with the interests 
of  capital and labour aligned, industry would be more productive.40 As a young Winston 
Churchill, speaking in 1897, put it, if  ‘the labourer will become, as it were, a shareholder’ 
then he ‘would not be unwilling to stand the pressure of  a bad year because he had shared 
some of  the profits of  a good one.’41 However, workers could hardly agree to risk so much 
on one business that might well fail – in a way no prudent shareholder would do.42 Profit-
sharing and co-partnership gained poor reputations because, wrote Sidney and Beatrice 
Webb, they were ‘taken up by the most reactionary persons’. It was such ‘an attack on, or at 
least a proposal for the supersession of  Trade Unionism, that it aroused the fiercest 
opposition; and the very idea became anathema in the Trade Union world.’43  
 
(1) LET’S ‘PUT THIS DIFFERENTLY’ 
The turn of  the 20th century was the formative period for labour law as a discipline for two 
main reasons. First, in 1901 when the House of  Lords tried to suppress strikes by making 
trade unions pay employers for the costs,44 a Labour Representation Committee met at 
Farringdon Hall and resolved to run for Parliament. The new ‘Labour Party’ influenced the 
Liberal Party enough to pass the Trade Disputes Act 1906, protecting any collective action 
‘in contemplation or furtherance of  a trade dispute’. Second, labour law’s first textbooks 
                                                          
36 S Webb and B Webb, A History of  Trade Unionism (Longmans 1920) 403. 
37 His view of  the scheme is recorded in Sir G Livesey, Paper on the profit-sharing scheme of  the South Metropolitan Gas 
Company, its history and results (Co-Partnership Conference of  the Labour Association at Newcastle-on-Tyne, October 
14th, 1899) 
38 South Metropolitan Gas Act 1896 s 19, with over £40,000 of  investment, workers could elect one, and then up to 
three directors, depending on how many ordinary shares were purchased. 
39 The Commercial Gas Company and the South Sub-urban Gas Company ran similar schemes until the Gas Act 1948. 
40 JS Mill, Principles of  Political Economy (7th edn Longmans 1909) Book IV, ch 7, §5, para 20. 
41 W Churchill, Speech at Claverton Manor (26 July 1897) extracted in M Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Youth, 1874-1900, pt. 
2. 1896-1900 (Heinemann 1966) 772. 
42 See Trustee Act 2000 s 4(3)(b). Investment in 20 companies allows 95% of  the diversification benefits of  a full index 
portfolio, and 100 companies 99%, see RA Brealey and SC Myers, Principles of  Corporate Finance (3rd edn 1988) 156.  
43 S Webb and B Webb, A History of  Trade Unionism (Longmans 1920) 653. 
44 Taff  Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society of  Railway Servants [1901] AC 426, cf  Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1. 
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were written, and teaching began at the London School of  Economics.45 Initially, the 
Webbs maintained a theory that workers should stay away from the direction of  industry.46 
Employee share schemes had failed.47 Collective bargaining was the true meaning of  
Industrial Democracy. Labour law should create a minimum floor of  rights, and collective 
bargaining ensured fairness beyond the minimum. And indeed, from 1906 with a 
sympathetic government, union membership expanded rapidly.48  
 
The Webbs’ initially theorised that workers should abstain from management because there 
were three functional production decisions. A strict separation of  powers was best. 
Consumers, by market choice, determined ‘what to produce’. Management (and by 
extension shareholders) determined ‘how to produce’. And workers, with unions and 
collective agreements, should settle ‘the conditions of  production’.49 Conflicts of  interest 
‘permanently disqualified’ consumers and management or shareholders from controlling 
                                                          
45 Calendar for the London School of  Economics and Political Science at London University (1895-1896) LSE Archives, 
LSE/Unregistered/27/5. These show a course in ‘Commercial and Industrial Law’ taught by JEC Munro from 1895, 
and from 1896 there was ‘Problems of  Trade Unionism’ taught by Sidney Webb. In 1899, a course called ‘Problems 
of  Trade Unionism and Factories Legislation’ was taught by Beatrice Webb. 
46 Royal Commission on Labour (1891-1892) C 7603 and S Webb and B Webb, A History of  Trade Unionism (Longmans 
1920) 650, ‘we find from beginning to end absolutely no claim, and even no suggestion, that the trade union should 
participate in the direction of  industry, otherwise than arranging with the employers the conditions of  the wage-
earner’s working life.’ 
47 S Webb and B Webb, ‘Cooperative Production and Profit Sharing’ (Special Supplements 1914-1915) New Statesman.  
48 On income inequality, E McGaughey, ‘All in ‘it’ together: worker wages without worker votes’ (2016) 27(1) KLJ 1. 
49 S Webb and B Webb, Industrial Democracy (Longmans, Green & Co 1920) Part III, ch IV, 822. 
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conditions of  production, because they would only want cheaper goods, unconcerned by 
people’s living standards. Workers were disqualified from deciding what was produced and 
how by their less specialised knowledge, and lack of  concern for consumer demand.50 On 
the essential question of  who determined the distribution of  an enterprise’s product, there 
had only to be joint settlement through collective bargaining. The role of  workers or their 
unions was not, initially, in management.51  
 Despite this conceptual neatness, a few more worker participation laws had been 
spreading.52 The Coal Mines Regulation Act 1887 required that ‘checkweighers’, who 
weighed the amount of  coal a worker brought up from the pits, were elected by workers.53 
The Port of  London Act 1908 section 1(7) may have been the world’s first pure board level 
codetermination law outside universities, even if  limited to allowing one worker 
representative to be appointed to the Port of  London Authority’s board of  directors, in 
consultation with trade unions.54 It was probably written by David Lloyd George,55 before 
he left the Board of  Trade for the Exchequer, though its passage through Parliament was 
completed by Winston Churchill.56 Furthermore, in 1915 a joint committee on naval and 
military pensions was formed with worker representation.57 In those ways alone, there was 
no clear separation of  economic powers.  
 Whether it was these examples, the War, or something else, by 1920 the Webbs 
decided they should have ‘put this differently’. In a new appendix to The History of  Trade 
Unionism, the Webbs said circumstances had changed for worker representation in 
management.58 They now approved of  the seating of  worker or union representatives on 
boards of  companies, and highlighted this as a particularly important goal ‘in all publicly 
                                                          
50 S Webb and B Webb, Industrial Democracy (1920) 818-820. 
51 See also, S Webb and B Webb, The History of  Trade Unionism (Longmans Green & Co 1920) ch I, 17, ‘direction and 
control... are the special functions of  the entrepreneur.’ 
52 The collection put together by W Milne-Bailey, Trade Union documents (Bell 1929) is invaluable. 
53 Coal Mines Regulation Act 1887 ss 13 and 14. See also Coal Mines (Check Weigher) Act 1894 s 1 (offence to interfere 
with appointment of  a check weigher), Coal Mines (Weighing of  Minerals) Act 1905 s 1 (checkweigher cannot be 
removed except by a ballot of  those who appointed) and Coal Mines Act 1911 s 16 (inspectors).  
54 Port of  London Act 1908 s 1(7) 
55 See his remarks at the Second Reading, Port of  London Bill, Hansard HC Debs (6 May 1908) vol 188, cols 330-331.  
56 HC Debs (23 July 1908) vol 193, cols 342-3. 
57 Naval and Military War Pensions Act 1915 s 2(2) 
58 S Webb and B Webb, The History of  Trade Unionism (1920) 760, Appendix VIII, The Relationship of  Trade Unionism 
to the Government of  Industry. ‘In 1920, after nearly a quarter of  a century of  further experience and consideration, 
we should, in some respects, put this differently. The growth, among all classes, and especially among the manual 
workers and the technicians, of  what we may call corporate self-consciousness and public spirit, and the diffusion of  
education coupled with further discoveries in the technique of  democratic institutions would lead us today to include, 
and even to put in the forefront, certain additional suggestions...’ 
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owned industries and services’.59 ‘The need for final decisions,’ they wrote, ‘will remain,’ but 
they said they had previously ‘confined [them]selves unduly to a separation of  spheres of  
authority’. Along with board level participation, increased consultation through multiple 
levels of  work councils, and consensus based decision making, informed by extended 
financial and social reporting, was apt to replace ‘a great deal of  the old autocracy’.60  
 However, the political debate had also moved to a grander scale. In 1917, Sidney 
Webb had participated in drafting a constitution for the Labour Party. He wrote clause IV, 
which said that among the party’s objects were ‘the common ownership of  the means of  
production, distribution and exchange, and the best obtainable system of  popular 
administration and control of  each industry or service.’ This was not actually a demand to 
‘nationalise everything’, because ‘common ownership’ did not require the state as an 
intermediary. Nevertheless, complete nationalisation was to some extent an aim the Webbs 
supported.61 Though they had changed their minds, that worker involvement in 
management could be positive, they conflated this with public ownership of  industry. This 
envisaged one model of  governance for all types of  enterprise, as if  one size might fit all. 
To socialise power, they thought it necessary to socialise ownership. This remained a basic 
model of  thought in the British labour movement over the 20th century.  
 
(2) VOLUNTARISM AND SHARE SCHEMES 
After World War One, the UK was moving closer toward political democracy. The 
Representation of  the People Act 1918 extended the vote for Parliament to all men over 
21, but only women over 30 who were married or met further property qualifications.62 
Rather romantically, at the Bill’s second reading, Sir George Cave said, 
 
War by all classes of  our countrymen has brought us nearer together, has opened 
men’s eyes, and removed misunderstandings on all sides. It has made it, I think, 
                                                          
59 S Webb and B Webb, The History of  Trade Unionism (1920) 760, ‘It is a real social gain that the General Secretary of  the 
Swiss Railwaymen’s Trade Union should sit as one of  the five members of  the supreme governing board of  the Swiss 
railway administration. We ourselves look for the admission of  nominees of  the manual workers, as well as of  the 
technicians, upon the executive boards and committees, on terms of  complete equality with the other members, in all 
publicly owned industries and services...’ 
60 S Webb and B Webb, The History of  Trade Unionism (1920) 761. 
61 Their ideas at the time are found in S Webb and B Webb, A constitution for the socialist commonwealth of  Great Britain 
(1920) reviewed by JR Commons, ‘The Webbs’ Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth’ (1921) 11(1) American 
Economic Review 82. 
62 The vote was only equalised by the Representation of  the People (Equal Franchise) Act 1928. 
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impossible that ever again, at all events in the lifetime of  the present generation, 
there should be a revival of  the old class feeling which was responsible for so 
much, and, among other things, for the exclusion for a period, of  so many of  our 
population from the class of  electors.63 
 
Similar sentiments pushed industrial democracy: looking at constitutionalising the company, 
as well as collective bargaining, with adversarialism momentarily reduced. But something of  
that ‘old class feeling’ appeared to remain, and it meant reform happened differently. To 
begin, the Coal Industry Commission Act 1919 set up a thirteen person commission, with 
Sidney Webb and the future Lord Chancellor, Justice Sankey, as chair. It considered coal 
miners’ wages and conditions, industry prices and profits, and whether the future 
organisation of  the mines should continue on the ‘present basis’, or ‘joint control, 
nationalisation, or any other basis’.64 Justice Sankey’s majority report recommended 
nationalisation, and that workers elect four out of  fourteen representatives of  proposed 
District Mining Councils.65 These would in turn appoint a National Mining Council 
according to their mining output, presided over by the minister. An addendum report, from 
mining representatives and the economist members, emphasised the importance of  joint-
representation,66 and while favouring the broad thrust, supported a draft Nationalisation of  
Mines and Minerals Bill 1919. Clause 1 envisaged a 21 member Mining Council to run the 
state enterprise, where ten were appointed by the Miners’ Federation of  Great Britain.67  
 A minority report rejected nationalisation. It supported worker votes in pit 
committees, district and national councils, which boards of  directors would consult. But 
‘the Executive Authority of  the Management should not be impaired’.68 The Mining 
Industry Act 1920 followed the minority report. It allowed advisory committees for 
                                                          
63 Hansard HC Debs (21 May 1917) vol 94, col 2135. Between this and 1867, the Representation of  the People Act 
1884 had extended the vote to around two thirds of  men. It was not until the Representation of  the People Act 1928 
that women could vote at the same age as men. 
64 Coal Industry Commission Act 1919 s 1(f) 
65 Coal Industry Commission, vol II, Reports and Minutes of  Evidence on the Second Stage of  Inquiry (1919) Cmd 360, page x, 
recommendation LIX. nb other representatives would be chosen by the NMC to represent consumers, and suppliers. 
66 (1919) Cmd 360, page xiii, from Frank Hodges, Leo Money, Robert Smillie, Herbert Smith, RH Tawney and Sidney 
Webb, supporting proposals by Mr W. Straker, see pages 944 to 946, referring to Mr Henry H. Slesser’s bill.  
67 (1919) Cmd 360, page 922. The Bill is appended to the evidence of  Mr Henry H. Slesser, counsel for the union, 
drafted on the recommendations of  Mr W. Straker. 
68 (1919) Cmd 360, page xviii-xix (Arthur Balfour, RW Cooper, Sir Adam Nimmo, Sir Allan M Smith, and Evan 
Williams). cf  page xxvi, Sir Arthur Duckham in a lone report proposed a minimum of  two worker representatives on 
the board of  directors itself. Coincidentally, this is what was achieved in Germany by the Aufsichtsratsgesetz 1922, 
the first precursor to today’s Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976.  
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welfare, recreation and well being, and contained sections for elected pit committees at 
every mine.69 These were only supposed to make recommendations to employers. By 
contrast, as R.H. Tawney had put it, mine workers felt that shareholder control for 
pecuniary gain ‘by a comparatively small number of  persons’ was,70  
 
for ends and by means with regard to which they are not consulted. They believe 
that, in virtue of  their practical experience, they can make important contributions 
to the program of  their industry, and that these contributions are frequently not 
welcomed by the management today.  
 
No doubt dejected at the failure of  the nationalisation plan, the miners and the union did 
not take up the offer: they saw consultation committees as a sham. A few years later the 
miners changed their minds, but by then a less sympathetic government was in power, and 
it refused.71 Labour representation was also recommended for port authorities generally, 
and for Bristol dock workers in particular,72 and to administer the National Unemployment 
Insurance Scheme.73  
 The development that probably came closest to significant reform was in the 
railways. In a Ministry of  Transport command paper, the government proposed 
amalgamating the existing railway companies into six regional groups, each with its own 
board. The plan then said this.74  
 
The composition of  the Board is considered to be of  the greatest importance, and 
whilst in the past the directors of  railway companies have all been appointed by the 
shareholders, the Government are of  the opinion that the time has arrived when 
the workers, both official and manual workers, should have some voice in the 
management. 
                                                          
69 Mining Industry Act 1920 ss 4 and 20; ss 7-17 were not put into effect. 
70 RH Tawney, ‘The British Coal Industry and the Question of  Nationalization’ (1920) 35(1) Quarterly Journal of  
Economics 61, 104.  
71 Recounted in W Milne-Bailey, Wirtschaftsdemokratische Strömungen in England (1928) 20-21, which states it is a translation 
from English (presumably with a title like ‘Trends of  Economic Democracy in England’) but that does not seem to 
be published. 
72 See W Milne-Bailey, Trade Union documents (1927) Sources 223 and 225. See also 228 on the Cotton Control Board 
(1917-1919). 
73 Unemployment Insurance Act 1920 s 17 and see Ministry of  Labour, Report on Nation Unemployment Insurance (1923) 42 
(884). 
74 Ministry of  Transport, Outline of  Proposals as to the Future Organisation of  Transport Undertakings in Great Britain and their 
Relation to the State (1920) Cmd 787, 2. 
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It went on to propose that shareholders retain the right to appoint a majority, and on the 
other side ‘one-third might be leading administrative officials of  the group, to be co-opted 
by the rest of  the Board, and two-thirds members elected from and by the workers on the 
railway.’75 But between the report and Royal Assent, this part was dropped.  
 The general view is the plan was dropped because of  both employer reticence and 
division among trade union leaders, who thought worker participation needed to be 
coupled to nationalisation.76 It also appears from a previously secret Memorandum for the 
Cabinet by the Minister of  Transport, by Eric Geddes, that while the Labour Party supported 
the motion, the railway companies were ‘strongly opposed’, and traders were ‘officially 
silent’ but thought ‘introducing a new principle’ would have ‘far-reaching effects upon 
employers of  labour generally.’77 Attached to the memorandum is a draft Bill, where 
Schedule 2, paragraph 2(d) stated that one year after the Act, workers who had served 
seven years would would elect 4 out of  21 directors. In the end the Railways Act 1921 
brought in other elements of  the settlement that were already in collective agreements. 
There were statutory work councils which had functions such as writing principles for wage 
setting, training and workplace suggestions, a centralised wage board, and the Railway Rates 
Tribunal got a labour representative.78 Board level codetermination was no more.  
 Outside specific sectors, the general plan, while the Liberal party still led 
government, was to promote workplace participation voluntarily, at least on its face. The 
five short Whitley Reports from 1917,79 however, envisaged a very limited set of  objects. 
They were not based on a conviction that a right to participation derived from contribution 
to production, rather than a more amorphous view that workers were ‘affected’ by 
employers’ decisions. The goal was said to be ‘to secure co-operation by granting to 
workpeople a greater share in the consideration of  matters affecting their industry’. This, it 
said, could ‘only be achieved by keeping employers and workpeople in constant touch.’80 
                                                          
75 (1920) Cmd 787, 3. 
76 See the debate generally, and in particular, James Wilson, Hansard HC Debs (30 May 1921) vol 142, cols 652-654. 
Also, D Brodie, A History of  British Labour Law: 1867-1945 (Hart 2003) 177-179, citing PS Bagwell, The Railwaymen: the 
history of  the National Union of  Railwaymen (George, Allen & Unwin 1963) 410, ‘it will only require a little reflection to 
realise that the position of  representative employees on the board of  directors which were running the railways 
primarily for dividends and only secondarily for the public service would be untenable.’ 
77 Railways Bill, Memorandum for the Cabinet by the Minister of  Transport (March 1921) CP 2749, 6-7. 
78 Railways Act 1921 ss 20-24 and 62-66, referring to (1917) Cd 8606, §16. 
79 Starting with the Reconstruction Committee, Sub-Committee on Relations between Employers and Employed: Interim report on 
joint standing industrial councils (1917) Cd 8606. 
80 (1917) Cd 8606, §14. 
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Whitley also eschewed the creation of  general legal rights.81 Instead, under the Trade 
Boards Act 1918 sections 1(2) and 4(6), the Minister of  Labour could establish ‘trade 
boards’ where a sector was not unionised or collective bargaining was inadequate ‘for 
regulating the remuneration of  employment’. The aim was to make employers and unions 
establish Joint Industrial Councils themselves, and if  they refused, the Ministry would 
threaten to fix wages generally. This did not mean changing any company or business’ 
board, nor even requiring councils be elected to assume management functions within a 
firm. Instead, it was overarching, nationwide committees that were composed of  
representatives from unions and employers. It was institutionalised collective bargaining. 
 Whitley’s general model of  ‘voluntarism’, backed by the Ministry of  Labour’s legal 
power to fix wages, worked so long as the Ministry was active. In the event that was around 
three years. While Lloyd George remained in office, the Ministry gave considerable 
assistance to unions to organise the workforce.82 But as it was becoming clear that the 
Conservative party would win the 1922 election, Sir George Cave chaired a review of  the 
Ministry’s activities. Whether or not there was some ‘revival of  the old class feeling’, his 
Report recommended that the Ministry of  Labour be cut. It argued that trade boards had 
gone beyond their original function, to regulate the sweated trades, and their focus should 
be reduced only to industries where wages were ‘unduly low’.83 Some joint industrial 
councils survived the 1920s, such as those in wool and building. Some workplaces, 
voluntarily, kept worker voice in company policy making, particularly on pensions or social 
programmes.84 But generally the number of  councils, and their power, diminished without 
the support of  the Ministry.85 People’s voice at work fell back on and followed the fortunes 
of  collective bargaining.  
 Meanwhile, there was a revival of  enthusiasm for share based participation. After 
the War, the House of  Lords made its preferences clear, in a decision on expulsion of  a 
                                                          
81 (1917) Cd 8606, §21 ‘it may be desirable at some later stage for the State to give the sanction of  law to agreements 
made by the Councils, but the initiative in this direction should come from the Councils themselves.’ 
82 KD Ewing, ‘The State and Industrial Relations: ‘Collective Laissez-Faire’ Revisited’ (1998) 5 Historical Studies in 
Industrial Relations 1. 
83 Cave Committee, Report to the Ministry of  Labour of  the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Working and Effects of  the 
Trade Board Acts (1922) Cmd 1645, thus returning to a position slightly better than under the first Trade Boards Act 
1909. It had, however, survived outright abolition in the Conservative and Liberal coalition’s proposed programme of  
cuts: see the Geddes Report, Committee on National Expenditure. First interim report of  Committee on National Expenditure 
(1922) Cmd 1581, at 141 ff. 
84 eg Bournville Works, A Works Council in Being (1922) LSE Archives HD5 118. 
85 See Model Constitution and Functions of  a Joint Industrial Council (1961) Appendix I , 209, in Ministry of  Labour, Industrial 
Relations Handbook (HMSO 1961) 24. 42 (3386). 
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union member. In Amalgamated Society of  Carpenters and Joiners v Braithwaite, a group of  
workers were expelled from their union for joining a profit-sharing scheme of  their 
employer, Lever Bros Ltd.86 The union’s rules were designed to hinder sham forms of  
workplace participation, penalising any involvement in ‘a co-partnership system when such 
system makes provision for the operatives holding only a minority of  the shares.’ Their 
Lordships reversed a line of  cases stating that the courts would not interfere in union 
affairs, and then inventively construed the union’s rules to prevent the expulsion. While 
declaring that this had no influence upon their decision, Lord Buckmaster noted that the 
‘right to give and to withhold labour has on certain occasions unfortunately proved to be 
the only means of  obtaining the redress of  grievances’ and suggested it may well be better 
if  workers and employers’ interests were not kept so apart.87  
 Given their rhetoric, it seemed their Lordships supported the various kinds of  
profit-sharing and co-partnership plans that continually returned to Parliament. The first 
had been a Companies (Co-partnership) Bill in 1913, proposing that limited liability be 
contingent on giving workers shares.88 Members of  government continued to be interested, 
and reviews were conducted on how it might be promoted, knowing full well that share 
schemes usually led to workers gaining no actual voting rights.89 Bills continued to be 
proposed through the 1920s and 1930s,90 and in 1925 an MP called Noel Skelton coined a 
new term for this set of  ideals. He favoured the progress of  a ‘property owning 
democracy’, originally a reference to real property, but soon generalised in all respects.91 A 
Liberal industrialist named Alfred Mond caught some attention for a while with his 
proposals for more partnership and initiatives for share purchase,92 but it never came to a 
law.  
 In contrast, during the same period, Harold Laski, who had been closely involved 
                                                          
86 [1922] 2 AC 440. 
87 [1922] 2 AC 440, 452. 
88 See Hansard HC Deb (7 May 1913) vol 52, col 2032.  
89 See J Hilton, Report on Profit Sharing and Labour Co-Partnership in the United Kingdom (1920) Cmd 544, 44. 
90 eg Copartnership Bill 1925, see HC Deb (3 April 1925) vol 182 cols 1754-94, and Profit Sharing Bill, see HC Deb (6 
March 1931) vol 249 cols 737-74.  
91 Hansard HC Deb (26 March 1925) vol 182, cols 773-776, ‘the future of  trade and employment in this country 
depends, first and foremost, upon a constant upholding of  the principle of  private enterprise and private property, 
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that through any form of  State control, far less of  State ownership, you will get improved production, improved 
work, and improved conditions, in my judgment the real hope of  this country and in particular the real hope of  the 
working classes, lies in the development of  what I venture to call a property-owning democracy.’ 
92 Representative of  his views is a speech during a debate on the ‘Conditions of  the Working Classes’, Hansard HC Deb 
(7 April 1925) vol 182, cols 2169-2710. 
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with the Labour party, had also promoted the policy of  giving half  a company’s board seats 
to representatives of  managers and workers, to ‘have equal power with the representatives 
of  invested capital’. He also sought one vote per shareholder, regardless of  size of  
shareholding.93 This proposal, however, did not seem to square with what one may 
presume was the more basic aim he expressed, to ‘prevent interference with the direction 
of  an industrial enterprise by the loaners thereto of  capital.’94 Laski became increasingly 
controversial within his own party, and was eventually alienated when he remarked that 
violent overthrow of  government might be needed if  Labour did not win the 1945 
election. The general result, when the first majority Labour government was elected to win 
the peace, was that it was not interested in share schemes nor, it seemed, codetermination. 
 
(3) ‘WHAT THE STATE HAS NOT GIVEN...’ 
Toward the end of  the Second World War the Trades Union Congress and the Labour 
Party had a common objective to avoid a repeat of  the post-World War One policies. First, 
the view had formed that Joint Industrial Councils had tried to do too much. Instead, the 
Wages Councils Act 1945 was passed to clarify the focus of  councils as applicable to wage 
negotiations only, while allowing a court to make terms in collective agreements binding on 
all employers.95 While collective bargaining remained central it could be said, as did Ernest 
Bevin, at the Second Reading, that the bedrock of  the system was still to be ‘the most 
priceless thing in this country, something which has carried us through the war without loss 
of  our liberties, the great voluntary system of  negotiation’.96  
 Second, when Labour was elected in 1945, the Government generalised its 
nationalisation programme. However, in contrast to the post-World War One 
developments, worker codetermination was held to be unnecessary: a single channel would 
do. The TUC did in fact argue that workpeople had a right to ‘participation in 
management’, but also that boards of  nationalised industries should be appointed 
according to their competence alone, even if  union members might well merit strong 
consideration.97 Thus, the worker participation they envisaged would be channelled through 
                                                          
93 H Laski, A Grammar of  Politics (George, Allen & Unwin 1925) republished by DA Reisman (ed) (Pickering & Chatto 
1996) 479-480.  
94 Laski (1925) 113.  
95 O Kahn-Freund, ‘The Wages Councils Bill’ (1945) 8(1) Modern Law Review 68. 
96 Ernest Bevin, Second Reading of  the Wages Councils Bill, Hansard HC Deb (16 January 1945) vol 407, cols 70-71 
97 TUC, Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction (1944) 21-22. 
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four stages of  representation: first from workers through unions, second through the 
Labour party, third through government, and fourth to the state owned enterprise that was 
the employer. Without being pushed, the Labour Party leadership was only prepared in the 
nationalisation legislation to allow references to looking at diverse candidates for directors, 
including people experienced in ‘the organisation of  workers’, at most.98 So firm was this 
view that when the gas industry underwent nationalisation, all worker directors were 
abolished. The 1896 South Metropolitan Gas Company’s plan, for one, had continued to 
allow a minority of  employee representatives on the board. The reason for abolition said 
Minister for Fuel and Power, Hugh Gaitskill, was there were in any event ‘actually very few 
cases’ where ‘the employees or their representatives take an active part in managing the 
business.’99  
 The result was a clearer separation than ever of  the sphere of  managers from the 
managed. One of  the newest British labour lawyers, Otto Kahn-Freund was firmly 
supportive. A Berlin Labour Court judge who fled the Nazis, Kahn-Freund believed British 
labour law should be positively described as a system of  ‘collective laissez faire’. On this 
view collective agreements were not binding because it was intended by the parties, and so 
workplace regulation was in its basic components voluntary. Labour law was meant to be 
more labour than law. This was normatively defensible, thought Kahn-Freund, to preserve 
union independence from employers, and union autonomy from the state. ‘What the State 
has not given,’ said Kahn-Freund, ‘the State cannot take away’.100  
 On the other side, Winston Churchill, in his leadership of  the Conservatives, and at 
the Party conference of  1946 adopted the Skelton slogan of  the property owning 
democracy, together with familiar themes of  promoting partnership at work and profit-
sharing.101 After his re-election in 1951, occasional debate continued,102 but no substantive 
legislation was passed. Union membership was at an all time high, and so if  people did 
                                                          
98 eg Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1945 s 2(3). 
99 Gas Act 1948. See also Mr Hugh Gaitskill, Minister for Fuel and Power, Second Reading, HC Deb (10 February 1948) 
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100 O Kahn-Freund, ‘Labour Law’ in M Ginsberg, Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Century (1959) 215, 244. 
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102 Hansard HC Deb (28 January 1955) vol 536, cols 563.  
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have more voice in their workplaces now, it was not because of  shares, but collective 
bargaining. The drawback was the growing discontent with the incidence of  industrial 
stoppage. It threatened to unravel the uneasy post-war consensus, especially as division 
spread to the Labour Party.103 
 Labour returned to power in 1964, and shortly afterwards the TUC firmed its 
stance on involvement in management. In its submission to a Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions, chaired by Lord Donovan, the TUC suggested that public companies should begin 
introducing worker directors, and it would be desirable to have discretionary legislation ‘to 
allow companies to make provision’ for union representatives on boards of  directors.104 
While legislation was plainly needed for nationalised bodies, in fact company law required 
no amendment, unless the goal was to change default rules, make possibilities explicit, or 
make changes easier. Individual company constitutions ordinarily allowed anybody to be 
appointed to a board by the existing board. Moreover any company’s articles of  association 
could be amended by a 75 per cent vote of  shareholders to require, for example, a certain 
proportion of  employee representatives, or indeed a certain portion of  votes in the general 
meeting for workers. Both could be secured by collective agreement. What the TUC’s 
submissions suggest is that although trade unions were reaching an historical high point in 
their bargaining power and political influence, a culture of  avoiding involvement in 
management constrained action. This was reflected by the Labour Party’s own policy 
document in 1967, which envisaged trade unions being an integrated ‘single channel of  
worker representation’. 
 The Donovan Report reflected some of  the TUC’s uncertainty.105 Seven of  the 
twelve members argued they could not recommend worker directors because their duties 
would conflict with the obligation to promote the success of  the company. Though this 
seems to have been a very misguided understanding of  company law,106 the seven added 
that a worker director might find their situation impossible if  he or she had to recommend 
                                                          
103 In a symbolic overview, see the White Paper, In Place of  Strife: A Policy for Industrial Relations (1969) Cmnd 3888, which 
proposed among other things the requirement for a ballot of  members before a strike.  
104 Trades Union Congress, Trade Unionism (1966) §290.  
105 Lord Donovan, Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations (1968) Cmnd 3623, 1997.  
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redundancies, and anyway it would distract from reform of  collective bargaining. Otto 
Kahn-Freund was on the Commission, and probably one if  its most influential members. 
On this issue, he was with a minority, but he only seemed able to voice a reserved 
endorsement. His view was that worker directors would probably produce no ‘immediate 
and dramatic results’ but that experiments were ‘desirable’ and so they should progress ‘on 
a voluntary basis’.107 The Labour Party’s policy mirrored this: though it was silent on private 
industry, they had committed to worker directors in nationalised industries.108 By contrast, 
the Liberal Party had committed to a comprehensive representation system, across the 
private sector, that would have meant employees had a quarter of  votes in a company’s 
general meeting. However, this was linked to a requirement that employees purchased 
shares: if  workers purchased enough shares, seats on a board would be guaranteed.109  
 The first experiments which took place were in steel.110 The Iron and Steel Act 
1967 expressly allowed worker directors to be installed, in consultation with the 
government,111 and from 1968 the plan was carried through. The model was necessarily 
‘consociationalist’, so that a director represented workers as a distinct interest group, rather 
than being elected to represent all interests together.112 The TUC provided a shortlist from 
which the corporation’s chairman made a selection, but initially the directors sat merely on 
divisional boards, not the board of  the whole corporation.113 In 1977 the government 
appointed six trade unionists to the corporation’s main board, though this was still a 
minority. Experience was mixed, largely because the union nominated directors remained 
separated from management functions.  
 Nevertheless, the Industry Act 1975 created a statutory aspiration that the National 
Enterprise Board, originally envisaged to extend state ownership, would start ‘promoting 
industrial democracy in undertakings which the Board control’.114 A similar statutory 
aspiration was created for companies falling under British Aerospace and British 
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Shipbuilders when the industries were identified for nationalisation in 1977.115 One of  the 
effects was that a few managements of  the still-private companies instituted their own 
form of  employee participation, in the hope it might stall nationalisation. Inevitably, the 
actual influence by the employee representatives was restricted in these plans.116 Little else 
could came of  these vague statutory exhortations in such a short time. Similarly the Post 
Office Act 1977 enlarged the board that controlled the Royal Mail and Britain’s 
Telecommunications network from twelve to nineteen members, to include seven union 
representatives.117 Although this was opposed by the previous directors, it only lasted two 
years, and the union nominees received little training,118 their experience appeared 
harmonious enough to be complimented in the 1979 annual report.119 
 The nationalisation experiments were accompanied by heated debate about a 
general codetermination programme, which never quite came into effect. The UK’s 
accession to the European Economic Community in 1973 meant it had joined continent-
wide discussion about codetermination, at least where social democrat governments were 
elected.120 However, leading representatives in the Labour Party seemed to be in two minds 
about the issue, unsure whether it was a distraction from collective bargaining, or whether 
any proposal would be enough.121 The Bullock Report proposed to extend union directors 
to half  of  every company board, with independent representatives in the middle appointed 
by government, a 2x + y formula.122 A Minority Report argued that employee 
representatives should only sit on a separate board, and that employees be allowed to elect 
representatives directly, rather than the union choose. The government’s response, in its 
1978 White Paper, was to instead propose a two-tier board structure where unions selected 
a minority of  directors in the supervisory board.123 The Confederation of  British Industry, 
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meanwhile, promised ‘unremitting hostility’ to union members sitting on boards.124 And 
indeed, the proposal was not a gradual change. 
 Where was the support for codetermination among the unions and labour lawyers? 
Most unions were generally supportive, but held strongly to the idea that they should 
remain the single channel for employee representation. They had a variety of  incompatibly 
personalised views on what the exact structure of  boards should be. A number of  
prominent unions remained opposed to the plans, because the tacitly the plans endorsed 
the existence of  a private sector.125 Among academics, there were similar splits. On the one 
hand there was the conviction that codetermination, even on a consociationalist model, was 
the best way to increase accountability and reduce the numbers of  strikes.126 Kahn-Freund, 
however, could not bring himself  to support the plans. Though ‘a personal observation’, he 
could not forget the Weimar Republic’s experience with its own ‘feeble and half-hearted 
scheme’, noting especially the ‘measure of  legalism which may be excessive’.127 A 
scepticism of  the law, and a mistrust of  management, obscured its positive use as tool for 
social progress. Added to divisions in the Labour cabinet about the role of  unions, and the 
looming winter of  discontent,128 this culture of  abstention meant divided support for 
codetermination in Britain. In the end, ‘what the state had not given’ the UK was a 
codetermination law. This did not mean there was nothing the state could take away. 
 
(4) SHARING SUCCESS? 
When Margaret Thatcher took power in 1979, experiments with industrial democracy in 
nationalised industries were ended. The worker directors at the Royal Mail were swiftly 
retrenched, and the promotion programmes put to a halt.129 Collective bargaining was also 
ended for a large majority of  UK workers, as ten major pieces of  legislation whittled away 
trade union power and membership. If  law reform could achieve so much, the description 
of  UK labour law as a system of  collective laissez faire did not capture how things worked. 
                                                          
124 CBI, In Place of  Bullock (May 1977).  
125 PL Davies and M Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy (Clarendon 1993) 403.  
126 eg PL Davies and KW Wedderburn, ‘The Land of  Industrial Democracy’ (1977) 6(1) ILJ 197-211. The TUC had lent 
its official support to codetermination with the publication, TUC, Industrial Democracy (1973) 34-36.  
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128 B Clift, A Gamble and M Harris, ‘The Labour Party and the Company’ in JE Parkinson, A Gamble and G Kelly, The  
Political Economy of  the Company (Hart 2000) ch 3, 76-80. 
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When government stopped promoting union membership, and turned hostile, it was clear 
that the union movement’s successes were not solely attributable to independent action in a 
voluntaristic economy. The two most significant legal changes were the same points, which 
had divided the Royal Commission of  1869:130 abolishing secondary action and the closed 
shop.131 There was a reform to company law, that directors should have regard to ‘the 
interests of  the company’s employees in general, as well as the interests of  its members’.132 
But this proved unenforceable, a paper duty, not least because it was very difficult to 
conceive how ad hoc court judgments could promote employee-friendly conduct among 
directors.133  
 Business, represented by the Institute of  Directors appeared to strike a conciliatory 
tone, that ‘employee involvement activities can... result in improved performance, efficiency 
and competitiveness.’134 However, instead of  genuine employee participation, the 
government said it was interested in employee ‘involvement’. That was,135  
 
the need to encourage increased employee involvement stressing in particular 
greater consultation and information, and the promotion of  share-ownership and 
profit-sharing. 
 
Indeed, the government’s privatisation plans for state owned industry involved employee 
share ownership schemes, probably in part to dilute worker opposition. For example, under 
the Transport Act 1985 the country’s buses were privatised, and many councils, especially 
those with Labour leaderships, instituted share schemes. Giving drivers and bus workers 
ownership was seen by some councils as a way to protect against asset stripping, and 
reduction of  services or wages.136 However, in a dramatically short space of  time, 
employees sold on their stakes, and so lost any voice they had, while the owners of  shares 
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131 Employment Act 1980 and Employment Act 1988.  
132 Companies Act 1980 s 46 and Companies Act 1985 s 309.  
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134 Institute of  Directors, ‘Employee Involvement’ Guide to Boardroom Practice No. 3 (London, 1983) 5.  
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tended to concentrate.137 On the other hand, during Major’s Conservative government, the 
first steps were taken toward statutory voting rights for people in pension schemes.138 This 
codified practices in collective agreements.139 It resulted from an extensive, and carefully 
thought through framework by Roy Goode, the country’s leading commercial lawyer: 
pension codetermination was written into law in 1995.140  
 Other political parties kept a commitment to employee participation in various 
forms for a while. The new Social Democrat Party proposed the implementation of  worker 
codetermination in a similar fashion to the White Paper of  1978,141 while the Labour Party 
remained committed to board level employee representation throughout the 1980s. In 1985 
it said this would make ‘A New Britain’.142 However, in 1994 a new leadership preferred to 
say, merely, that ‘non-executive directors of  companies should recognise that there are 
other stakeholders in the future of  the company than shareholders.’143 More attention was 
given to clause IV of  the Labour Party’s constitution, redrafted to eliminate the reference 
to nationalisation.144 In 1997, one of  the new Labour government’s first acts was to install a 
union representative on the board of  British Rail,145 and through the EU, the Information 
and Consultations Directives enabled elected work councils to demand negotiations before 
major economic changes.146 These complemented existing laws on health and safety, and 
collective redundancies.147 But the next step, that work councils might have binding rights 
to participate on specific issues, was not yet taken. There was also a new Directive on 
                                                          
137 L Trewhitt, ‘Employee Buyouts and Employee Involvement: A Case Study of  Investigation of  Employee Attitudes’ 
(2000) 31(5) Industrial Relations Journal 451. 
138 As mentioned above, in the Pensions Act 1995. See now the Pensions Act 2004 ss 241-243. 
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Employees Directive 2002/14/EC and the Transnational Information and Consultation of  Employees Regulations 
1999 under the European Works Council Directive 2009/38/EC. 
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Employee Involvement in European Companies,148 but any employee involvement would 
be negotiated from a company’s existing position on workplace representation. In the UK 
private sector that usually meant none, unless trade unions would begin to collectively 
bargain for votes in corporate governance.  
 After the Conservative led coalition succeeded at the 2010 election, there were 
three minor developments. First, a general philosophy was summed up in a 2012 
government paper, entitled Sharing Success: The Nuttall Review of  Employee Ownership. 
‘Employee share ownership,’ wrote the author Graeme Nuttall, ‘is a great idea.’149 What did 
this mean? It would be a priority to promote greater employee share ownership by 
awareness raising exercises and unspecific deregulatory measures.150 Second, in the Postal 
Services Act 2011 the government made clear its intention to sell off  at least part of  the 
Royal Mail, and in September 2013 it was announced that part of  the shares would be 
allocated to employees. A deep seated belief, that the appropriate method of  participation 
in the economy was buying shares, seemed to remain. Third, the Growth and 
Infrastructure Act 2013, section 31, enabled employees to sell rights, in return for company 
shares, that are unprotected by EU law minima: mainly fair dismissal and paid time off  to 
care for children. Few took this up,151 and that seemed to be rational. Less than ten years 
before, employees at the US energy firm Enron were encouraged to invest an average of  
62.5 per cent of  their retirement savings into Enron shares, and lost everything.152 Share 
schemes are imprudent: lacking diversification, with no guarantee of  meaningful voting 
rights.  
 On the other hand, in universities the rights of  staff  to vote in governance was 
alive as ever. The government briefly announced that it intended to abolish this right, but 
withdrew its plans after vocal protests by the Universities and College Union.153 One 
                                                          
148 European Company Regulation 2157/2001/EC and Employee Involvement Directive 2001/86/EC. PL Davies 
‘Workers on the board of  the European Company?’ (2003) 32 Industrial Law Journal 75. 
149 G Nuttall, Sharing Success: The Nuttall Review of  Employee Ownership (July 2012) 5.  
150 Sharing Success: The Nuttall Review of  Employee Ownership (2012) 5, ‘Employee ownership is a great idea. It means a 
significant and meaningful stake in a business for all employees.’ See also 60-69, discussing template ESOP models, 
exemptions from perpetuities rules, internal share market rules, and possibly a new legal entity. 
151 For additional problems related generally to employment rights, see J Prassl, ‘Employee Shareholder ‘Status’: 
Dismantling the Contract of  Employment’ (2013) 42(4) ILJ 307, noting at 337 that there had at the time been under 
10 inquiries of  interest by business. 
152 See PJ Purcell, ‘The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in Retirement Plans’ (11 March 2002) CRS Report for 
Congress, and JH Langbein, SJ Stabile and BA Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law (4th edn Foundation 2006) 640-
641.  
153 See currently Education Reform Act 1988, s 124A and Sch 7A, para 3, inserted by Further and Higher Education Act 
1992 s 71(4) and Sch 6, and ‘Government withdraws college governance reforms’ (3 November 2011) UCU. 
25 
example of  British codetermination endured after all. A new Trades Union Congress 
leadership had become strongly convinced of  the need to ‘take up every chance to re-shape 
economic relationships’, with new ‘models of  corporate governance that empower all 
stakeholders... worker and union involvement in corporate decision making’.154 At the 2015 
general election, a new Labour Party took on the proposal of  Lord Wedderburn,155 and 
committed to legislation for worker directors on the boards, in director remuneration 
committees.156 Details aside, it was historically apparent that the labour movement, in 
politics and unions, had become committed to multiple channels of  voice – ‘worker and 
union involvement’ – a new constitutional conception of  the company. Perhaps most 
astonishingly, in her bid to become Prime Minister after the ‘Brexit’ poll, Theresa May 
pledged the Conservative Party to legislate to enable worker representation on company 
boards,157 and both the Institute of  Directors and the Trades Union Congress signalled 
their endorsements. This was then clarified, at a CBI speech, to be ‘not about mandating’ 
codetermination.158 In the necessary, if  predictable, media rough and tumble, this was 
instantly called a ‘u-turn’ and ‘betrayal’,159 but a historical view might lend more optimism. 
After all, the Pensions Act 1995 first put member-nominated pension trustees into law with 
an opt-out, but this was soon firmed into a full duty.160 Indeed, one model that many will 
look to, of  German codetermination, was re-codified in 1951 and 1952 into law by 
conservatives, and strengthened in 1976 by all-party consensus.161 Developments today do 
suggest Britain had finally stopped ‘waiting for a political consensus [for] a fair day’s wage 
through votes at work [to become] central to every government’s labour policy.’162  
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3. CONCLUSIONS 
Does the UK have a ‘single channel’ for a voice at work, and is it committed to an 
‘adversarial’ conception of  the company? No. The stark truth, in most workplaces, is that 
people’s voice at work through the collective bargaining ‘channel’ has been put on mute. 
But also, history cautions against overplaying a single channel narrative. Through the 20th 
century votes at work operated on the ports, in gas, steel, post and buses, spanning private 
and public enterprises.163 The view that more codetermination has not yet emerged because 
of  a commitment to an adversarial model of  companies also seems overstated. Instead, 
there was uncertainty in the labour movement because of  a rival constitutional conception 
of  a company, demanding investment of  property for votes. Ironically, the most enduring 
model of  votes at work, as of  right, has been at universities: the forgotten governance 
structures of  corporations where people writing most about the ‘single channel’ worked. 
As social scientists, we sometimes forget we are, not just observers, but participants.  
 The question remaining is, in light of  the rich history of  experiment and debate, are 
there any significant barriers to a coherent structure for votes at work in Britain? More and 
more people know that the ‘director-centred’ model of  company law164 is probably the 
worst of  all worlds. But the monopolisation of  corporate governance by shareholders is 
not optimal either.165 The moral argument in favour of  hierarchical workplaces usually 
began with a formalist view that a work relationship is an obligation, not proprietary.166 
Investing property in a company entitled you to a vote. Investing labour in a company did 
not.167 But a property-obligation distinction does seem less relevant for claims to workplace 
participation today, as legal reasoning has shifted toward functional over formal analysis.168 
Similarly, the economic theory that investments of  capital are more ‘at hazard’ than 
investments of  labour in insolvency seems very dubious after repeated experience of  
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financial crisis.169 Both investments entail risks of  present and future loss, and few people 
think that the personal and structural risks of  unemployment are more benign than losses 
in a diversified share portfolio.170 The view that shareholding institutions should continue 
to monopolise corporate governance is giving way to a growing moral consensus,171 that 
anyone who makes a contribution to production should have a proportionate voice.172  
 Then there is the old ‘pro-capital’ argument, that votes at work might damage 
productive efficiency, or hamper enterprise. Sometimes it was said that workers are just not  
expert enough, and sometimes it is said that too many interests on a board will lead to 
conflict and sclerosis.173 This contention is tempered by behavioural evidence, qualitative 
research, and increasingly sophisticated quantitative data on long-run efficiency of  
workplace participation rights.174 The counter-proposition – that codetermination damages 
enterprise – has no credible empirical evidence behind it at all. When everyone is treated 
fairly, everyone is more productive. Indeed, proportionate voting rights for people at work 
limits the propensity for managerial agency costs. It prevents those with structurally 
unequal bargaining power from engaging in ‘negligence and profusion’ that always exists 
when some can unjustly enrich themselves from other people’s labour.175 
 Finally, history shows there was a (supposedly) ‘pro-union’ argument against votes 
at work: that it might spell the death of  trade unions, either because unionists get into bed 
with management, or codetermination would operate as a replacement for collective 
bargaining. These old speculations were always doubtful, because votes at work were 
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themselves a collective bargaining objective: not a substitute but a complement. As general 
workplace participation laws spread across developed democratic countries, it seems 
increasingly likely that the labour movement will keeping pushing for collective agreements, 
and legal codification, to enshrine the right to vote in enterprise constitutions. This is 
technically simple. A percentage of  employee votes can be reserved in annual general 
meetings, a minimum number of  employee representatives can be reserved on a board of  
directors, or both.176 In the 21st century, the old voluntarist myth is dead, and the arguments 
for shareholder monopolisation and the ‘single channel’ have diminished. People want 
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